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SLUMLORDISM AS A TORTA DISSENTING VIEW
Walter]. Blum* and Allison Dunham**
persistence of substandard housing in urban centers stands
as a challenge to law. There is a pressing need to re-examine
whether prevailing legal doctrines are adequate for dealing with the
problem and to suggest new doctrines where the old are found wanting.1 To their great credit, Joseph L. Sax and Fred J. Hiestand in
their article "Slumlordism as a Tort"2 face up to these tasks boldly
and vigorously. They conclude that, under existing conditions, it is
imprudent to rely on public authorities to enforce housing codes
and it is unlikely that legislatures will place sufficient enforcement
powers in private hands. Therefore they seek to locate an avenue
by which the courts can put private parties in a position to serve as
enforcement agencies. Their solution, as indicated by the title given
the article, is to make slumlordism into tortious conduct vis-a-vis
tenants.
The heart of their proposal is to expand what they regard as the
"traditional" category of intentionally inflicted indignities so as to
include leasing of housing units which are considerably below prescribed standards. A low income tenant would be allowed to recover
substantial tort damages from his landlord on the ground that, in
renting out accommodations which, through no fault of the tenant,
are far short of housing code standards, the landlord imposes on the
occupant a serious indignity while advancing his own economic
gain. The main goal of the proposal is to rid our cities of dilapidated
tenements by threatening the owner with the prospect of a heavy
penalty in the form of tort damages. In addition, the proponents
have designed their plan to serve two subsidiary objectives: (1) to
encourage tenants of slum buildings to do something themselves to
improve their living conditions; (2) to provide an apparatus through
which tenants can vent their indignation against landlords in court
instead of on the streets.
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We share the authors' enthusiasm for creative legal thinking in
this area. Moreover, we concur in their views that private enforcement of housing standards needs to be developed and strengthened,
that increasing the severity of criminal sanctions for violations is
only a sterile response, and that the role of government administrators should be de-emphasized. We believe, however, that making
a tort of slumlordism by the route recommended will not be a step
in the right direction.

I
At the outset it is worth considering how much of a change in
our rules of law the proposal requires. The plan might be viewed
congenially if it involves no more than a slight extension of an
existing tort category, whereas it might meet a different reception
if a significant change in the law is demanded.
Not all authorities concur in the view that courts recognize a
separate category of tort liability for intentional infliction of an
indignity.8 But if such a generic tort has now become established,
several ingredients seem to be required for obtaining redress under
it: (1) there must be a deliberate act by the defendant which is unwelcomed and unsolicited by the particular plaintiff; (2) the act
must be of such a nature that a reasonable man in the plaintiff's
circumstances would be justified in feeling humiliated, shamed, or
outraged by it; and (3) the conduct must cause severe emotional
distress to the plaintiff.4 Sax and Hiestand, of course, recognize that
renting substandard accommodations to a tenant does not on its face
appear to embody those elements. First, the landlord has no real
desire to humiliate any particular person in accepting tenants; if he
is an absentee owner, he probably neither has knowledge of any
particular tenants nor is in contact with them. Furthermore, in
occupying a slum dwelling, while the typical tenant may or may not
feel humiliated, he certainly does not display the usual signs of
severe emotional distress, and it should be recalled that he is an
active and voluntary party to the transaction. In the face of these con3. See C. GREGORY & H. K.ALVEN, CASES ON TORTS ch. 12 (1959).
4. The Restatement definition of the intentional infliction tort "requires the defendant to have intended that emotional harm be the consequences of his act."
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 47, comment a, at 80 (1965). The authors argue,
however, that an act can be outrageous in the absence of such a motive. Even if they
are correct, it does not follow that any deliberate act which is outrageous fits within
the usual conception of an intentionally inflicted indiguity. Consider, for example, a
deliberate act which arises from a noble motive, but which causes the person acted
upon to feel outraged.
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siderations, the proponents urge that courts should dispense with the
requirement of severe emotional distress and should recognize that
the realities of life in the slums differ from impressions formed by
outsiders. They insist that the downtrodden poor are not genuinely
voluntary parties to the transaction, inasmuch as only substandard
accommodations are available at rentals they are able to pay; 5 that
the poor in the slums do feel indignation over their conditions; and
that a slumlord by his very act of marketing dilapidated quarters
contributes to the humiliation felt by those trapped in the slum
communities. This is an ingenious effort to cut the pieces to fill the
die. When examined more closely, however, one sees that the slumlordism situation does not contain the traditional elements associated
with the tort of indignity, but rather consists of other ingredients
which at best are only faintly analogous. The fact is that there is a
world of difference between the classic indignity of deliberately
spitting into somebody's eye in order to humiliate him6 and renting
him substandard housing accommodations. If slumlordism is to be
made a tort, we should recognize that it is a wholly new breed and
not a mere variant of the dignitary category.

II
The proposal to make slumlordism a tort rests heavily on the
proposition that occupants of slums feel humiliated and outraged
by having to occupy dreadfully bad housing. This assertion has the
ring of an obvious truth, but further inspection of it suggests some
serious doubts.
Suppose that a particular slum was today occupied by groups
comparable to those living in urban slums several generations ago
-say, for example, Italians or Irish who had recently migrated to
the United States. How likely is it that anyone would argue that
these immigrants are humiliated by their landlords to such an extent that they should be allowed to recover punitive tort damages
from them? We doubt that this position would have much appeal
even if the newcomers were temporarily unable to afford better
5. The authors' position is that the poor do not enter into a tenancy "voluntarily and
knowingly" because their "range of choice is exceedingly narrow." 65 MICH. L. REv.
869, 893-94 (1967). It is worth noting, however, that many slum occupants made the
choice to move from rural to urban areas. Also, many of the slumdwellers "chose"
to have large families. Perhaps the authors would say that in this connection, too, the
poor do not act "voluntarily and knowingly"?
6. Alcorn v. Mitchell, 63 Ill. 553 (1872).
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living conditions. It would have even less attraction if, in fact, the
immigrants had previously been living in distinctly worse quarters.
It may well be that in many respects the pattern of life in the
contemporary Negro or Puerto Rican slum is not comparable to the
pattern found in the earlier Western European ethnic slum. Whatever the differences, the conduct and role of the slumlords in the
two situations appear to be essentially similar. To say that slumlordism would be a tort in the present setting but not in the earlier
is thus very troublesome.
There are certain similarities between the two settings which
should not go unnoticed. Many of the current inhabitants of the
worst urban slums are recent internal migrants who have fled rural
slums. These hovels are often far worse than their urban counterparts. Where a citizen actually improves his living conditions by
moving to an urban slum, is it realistic to regard him as suffering an
indignity, any more so than in the case of the European immigrant?
Further, city slums today are for many inhabitants a temporary staging area from which they move as soon as their finances permit. Is a
relatively short stay in a substandard structure a terribly humiliating
experience for those who pass through the slum on their way up the
ladder? Is it enough of an outrage as to call for severe penalties? And
is it a great outrage even where the landlord himself succeeded only
a short while ago in getting out of the slums?
These observations might be taken as suggesting that substandard housing visits serious humiliation only on those who have
been mired down in an urban slum for a long period. Perhaps this is
an accurate view of slum life, although it is sometimes said that the
old timers are the most resigned to their condition and the least
sensitive in reacting to it. But even if the view is realistic, there
would be good reason for refusing to accept the notion that renting
to long-time slum residents is a tort whereas renting to new arrivals
and temporary inhabitants of a slum community is not. Were this
the case, the former would probably appear to the landlord to be less
attractive tenants than the newly arrived. The veterans of the slums
already have enough of a handicap working against them, without
being subjected to a further burden in finding living accommodations.
III
It is implicit in the Sax and Hiestand article that their proposal
is limited to slumlordism in urban slums. The rationale on which
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they build, however, seems to take in a much larger section of life.
It therefore appears advisable to speculate on how far the new
theory might reach in enlarging the area protected by dignitary
tort redress. 7
The main foundation offered for making slumlordism a tort is
the assertion that occupants of dilapidated housing in urban slums
suffer a humiliating outrage when they are economically not in a
position to obtain better accommodations. It strikes us that this
proposition has equal or greater plausibility in the case of many
sharecroppers and migrant agricultural laborers. As compared to
urban slumdwellers, these rural workers often have smaller incomes,
are less "free" in their choice of living quarters, and occupy far
worse accommodations. From many points of view, the situation in
which the Mississippi Delta sharecroppers and the braceros find
themselves is more appalling than that experienced by their counterparts in urban slums. Should they too be allowed to collect punitive
tort damages from their "landlords"?
Further, within the urban slum it is not only the landlords who
provide poor quality goods or services which have the potential to
humiliate the consumer. Many a merchant runs his little business
under unsanitary, unsafe, and unaesthetic conditions, and much of
the merchandise is priced higher than in nearby middle-class residential areas. Indigents who live in the slum often are "trapped"
into patronizing these local merchants because they are unable to
get credit elsewhere or are not competent to shop outside their own
immediate neighborhood. 8 Under these circumstances should the
submarginal storekeeper also be liable in tort for adding to the humililiation of some of his customers?
And we must not overlook the used car dealer. A good guess
would be that in our motorized society, large numbers of the poor
feel greater indignity in driving a junky car than in occupying a
junky flat.
None of this is said to suggest that purchase or use of substandard
goods has all of the undesirable consequences that now are often
7. The proponents buttress their argument for the new tort on the basis of constitutional law precedents. These analogies are highly tenuous. Under some circumstances,
a plaintiff no doubt can recover from a private party who interferes with certain of
his constitutional rights, such as the right to vote. But, surely, a plaintiff would have
no tort redress against a private person who refused to drive him to the polling place, or
a private person who undertook to drive him there and never made it because his
car, which failed to meet safety standards, broke down. Recovery in tort for outrage
would not be allowed even if the private party charged for the transportation.
S. See generally D. CAPLOVITZ, Tm: POOR. PAY Mon: (1963).
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attributed to living in substandard housing. Rather, these considerations are put forward to question whether there is any offensiveness
peculiar to slummy housing as compared to slummy goods and
services.9

IV
Although Sax and Hiestand discuss the new tort in considerable
detail, they do not examine closely the nature of the question which
ultimately would be in issue.10 Each case is likely to be tried before
a jury. We can assume that the plaintiff would have to establish that
he had been a tenant of the defendant, that he had not been underallocating resources to housing, and that the accommodations he
occupied were significantly below code standards. Presumably, he
would not have to show that he actually felt humiliated in occupying
the quarters in question. We can also assume that the landlord would
be unlikely to contest the assertion that the plaintiff was his tenant;
and, to simplify, let us assume that the landlord would not dispute
the assertion that a proper share of the tenant's resources was allocated to paying rent. Remaining at issue, then-unless the landlord defends by blaming the condition of the premises on the tenant
-would be the question whether the building was so grossly below
standard as to be an "outrage."
I£ the jury is to decide whether the proved violations of the housing code constitute an indignity, the defendant is at the mercy of the
social conventions of randomly selected citizens in the community
and of their judgment as to whether the plaintiff is "entitled" to
claim he was insulted. The experience of one of us in drafting the
9. It is misleading on the part of the authors to analogize the slumlord to the doctor
who gives inadequate treatment. See 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 891 (1967). The law puts a
higher duty of care on the doctor because he holds himself out as a trained professional
and because the patient is not likely to be in a position to evaluate the care he is
getting. The slumlord is not a member of a learned profession; and the slum tenants
know as much about slum housing conditions as does the landlord.
10. The authors' precise formulation of the proposal is as follows:
[O]ne who undertakes to perform a service for his own economic benefit, but
who performs it in a way both inconsistent with those standards which represent
minimum social goals as to decent treatment and in a manner that itself is
violative of law, under circumstances where the victim had no meaningful alterna•
tive but to deal with him, commits a tort for which substantial damages ought to
lie. 65 MICH. L, REv. 869, 890 (1967).
We wonder about the relevance of the fact that the manner of performance "itself is
violative of law." For purposes of tort law, should it make a difference whether a
motorist was speeding negligently on a road not covered by a speed limit or was speeding negligently on a road that was subject to such a regulation? Again, why should tort
law distinguish between outrageous housing that violates a housing code and outrageous housing not subject to such a code? And further, why is it any less an outrage to
rent slum quarters than it is to make them available free, as a gift?
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housing code for Chicago is especially illuminating in this connection. The representatives of a very large ethnic group in the city,
with whom the draftsman consulted, not only saw nothing wrong
with community kitchens instead of a separate kitchen contained
within each dwelling unit, but argued that community kitchens
were an actual positive force in eliminating loneliness and inducing
friendships and mutual adjustments. Would a juryman from such
a group be likely to find that a community kitchen produces the
indignity which Sax and Hiestand obviously believe is the case?
Consider also the reaction of the judge. From the sanctuary of his
middle income status he might well reach the same conclusion as the
juryman, although for somewhat different reasons: either that this
condition is an inevitable step in upward mobility (he experienced it
and got out), or that it is all the poor are entitled to and for the
plaintiff to claim otherwise is to mark him as an eccentric or overly
sensitive person and not the "average Englishman" in similar circumstances-which is the standard of the historic common law.
V

"While the proponents of the new tort understandingly have not
attempted to work out all its possible intricacies, we sense that the
logic of their position leads to a number of strange, if not paradoxical, results. Perhaps no one of them alone detracts very much
from the proposal; taken together, however, they give us considerable added ground for skepticism.
Have Sax and Hiestand really provided the tenants with a
remedy? While they admit that there is a problem of the culpable
tenant and propose to give the landlord a defense, they are less than
clear as to the nature of this defense. For example, suppose that the
claim of indignity is based essentially on the "absence of rudimentary sanitary services," the facts being that the building is infested
with vermin and does not have adequate facilities for the disposal of
trash and garbage. Under these circumstances, who is the culpable
tenant they talk about? Is there a defense only if the landlord
establishes to the satisfaction of the court that the plaintiff's family
brought the vermin into the building and used the garbage can
covers as props for a game or the cans as drums for a dance? Or has
the landlord met his burden if he establishes that some tenants in
the building brought the vermin in and misused the disposal facilities? The context in which the authors speak of "tenant conduct"
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and of proof that the "tenants continue to misuse the facilities"
suggests that they refer to other tenants and not to the particular
plaintiff.11 If this reading is correct, then with the possible exception
of the complete "absence" of basic facilities, the landlord may well
have a defense in almost every case. If the proponents refer only to
conduct of the particular tenant who brings suit, then landlords may
be pushed into using a spy system more pervasive than any of the
imaginative writing about "1984."
In any event, it would seem that the landlord could minimize his
risk under the new tort by selecting the least disciplined set of
tenants. Such a policy would maximize his chances of demonstrating
that the complaining tenant, or perhaps other tenants, contributed
to the housing defects at issue. Moreover, since liability under the
proposed tort could also be avoided if the complainant was able to
pay higher rentals, slum landlords might seek to protect themselves
by renting only to those who were not, or who represented that they
were not, at the bottom of the income scale. These moves likewise
would be undesirable. They would make it more difficult for the
most poverty stricken families to find accommodations and would
further induce landlords to probe into the private lives of tenants.
Another question is whether every day of a tortious landlordtenant relationship constitutes a new and separate tort.12 If each day
(or week or month) brings another actionable outrage, penalties
would mount to unconscionable heights. If, however, the relationship between a particular landlord and a particular tenant constitutes at most a single redressable humiliation, it would follow that
11. The article is confusing on this important point. At 873 the authors urge "that
there be recognized a private tort action for the awarding of substantial damages to
the tenant who is not himself culpab1e." (Emphasis added.) At 904 they state:
Where the conditions upon which a finding of indecency is predicated are attributable to tenarit conduct, rather than merely to landlord neglect, we believe a
defense should be available. For example, if, despite the landlord's effort to make
repairs in the plumbing, tenants continue to misuse the facilities, causing repeated
breakdowns after such repairs, we would not hold the landlord liable for
finally giving up the effort. Similarly, if 1 •• tenants continue to throw garbage
in hallways and alleys •.•• [Emphasis added.]
At 910 the authors remark: "[l]t is only the imposition of these conditions by the
landlord which is to be redressed, and an appropriate showing of non-culpability by
the ,plaintiff tenants will be required." (Emphasis added.)
12. On the one hand, the authors state that "it is the act of renting or of maintaining
indecent housing whicll gives rise to the right of redress." 65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 911
(1967). 'Thus a short tenancy apparently will suffice; people can "buy themselves a
lawsuit for the price of a month's rent." Id. On the other hand, the authors note that
"tenant recovery depends upon a showing of adequate knowledge and notice, and that
recovery may be had only when the tenants have not caused the harm. To get to this
stage will sometimes require the passage of a period of time after the start of the
tenancy." Id. at 911 n.170.
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the more a slumdweller changes his address, the more he might be
able to collect in damages from slumlords.13 It is hard to see why the
quantum of actionable outrage should turn on whether the plaintiff
spends a given amount of time in the slums under one roof or many.
A further question is whether the courts would permit a landlord
to purchase the advance consent of his tenants to suffer indignities.14 Whatever the current status of intentionally inflicted indignities as a generic tort, recovery has not been forthcoming where the
claimant freely agreed to undergo a humiliation which otherwise
would be redressable. Perhaps courts today would reason that a slumdweller is under such strong coercion of circumstances that he is not
in a position to consent freely. It is not obvious, however, that this
result would be reached, especially where the landlord takes the precaution of paying some compensation to his tenants for their consent.
And even though such a payment might simply be offset by higher
rents, this relationship would not be easy to prove.
There is also the old problem of a retroactive law. If slumlordism
is to be made a tort, it would on the one hand seem unfair to assess
damages on the basis of conditions which existed long before the
new tort was given official recognition. Without retroactive application, on the other hand, a great many years would elapse before
the courts could hammer out its contours.
These reflections suggest that the new tort would better emerge
from legislation and not from adjudication. As a legislative proposal, however, it would have to compete with many other plans for
dealing with the urban slum problem. In that competition, slumlordism as a tort would not in our judgment rate very high.

VI
If those who own urban slum property come to believe that the
courts will sooner or later recognize the proposed tort of slumIordism, what is likely to be the impact on the operation of highly
13. The proponents take the position that "the possibility of multiple lawsuits, far
from being an obstacle, is perfectly consistent with the underlying theory of this article.''
Id. at 911. But they think that this phenomenon is "hardly likely to be a problem of
significant proportion in the light of the organizational demands imposed by our
view of the tenant culpability defense.'' Id.
14. It is argued by the authors that "[a] lease with a clause exculpating the landlord from tort liability also would be of no avail to the defendant" inasmuch as
"exculpation from liability for intentional torts is prohibited." Id. at 914. Note, however, that the usual rule may not be applicable in the case of infliction of a humiliation. What public policy weighs against purchasing from someone the right to spit in
his face-so long as others are not harmed?
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substandard properties? Will the response of slum owners to the new
tort be consonant with improvement of living conditions for the
poor? Several aspects of this question might be distinguished.
Although Sax and Hiestand do not say so explicitly, the tort
action apparently would run against the owner rather than the
manager or other person in possession or control of the property.16
Either way, however, the penalty would be an added cost of owning
a building operated in substandard condition. Inasmuch as any
qualifying tenant might sue for a substantial amount of damages, the
overhanging dollar threat to the owner would be indeed very great.
How are owners likely to meet this threat?
On quick impression it might seem that owners would hasten to
bring their highly substandard buildings up to code standards. Surely
this is a possibility, but not a very likely occurrence. Most slum buildings today are not brought up to standard because, taking account of
neighborhood conditions, the necessary improvements will fail to
bring sufficiently higher rentals to justify making the added investment. The imposition of the suggested tort penalty would not alter
this economic relationship. Another possibility is that the owners
will throw in the towel and allow those who hold the mortgages to
take over the buildings. Institutional investors are unlikely to hold
and operate slum properties, especially in the face of the new tort
penalty threat. Thus, wholesale demolition or, even worse, wholesale boarding-up of buildings conceivably might follow. 16 Still
another response for the owner is to attempt to minimize possible
exposure to damages by avoiding personal liability. In some jurisdictions we might expect each vulnerable property to be put into a
separate corporation or other legal entity that affords limitation of
15. Often the whole process of tenant selection and building maintenance is per•
formed by a management agent in the nature of an independent contractor. For liability of a person for the acts of an independent contractor, see REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 409-29 (1965).
16. The authors note the possibility that their remedy might bring about demolition
at too rapid a pace. However, they point out:
(T]he prosecution of a successful civil damage action, as we propose it, will not be
easy, and it is not likely that a vast number of landlords will be attacked simultaneously or will be successfully sued in a very brief period. Thus it is to be hoped
that the slumhousing market can be brought to its knees relatively gradually, so
that the legislatures may have some time to act before a great many landlords are
immediately threatened. Because of this, it may be anticipated that the process of
breakdown will be mitigated by the entry of speculators who, hoping the worst will
not happen, will to some extent buoy up the market before the worst does in fact
happen.
65 MICH. L. REv. 869, 920-21 (1967). Perhaps this prediction is correct; but it should be
observed that, unlike the receivership route, the process envisaged by the authors might
result in further deterioration of slum buildings throughout a considerable time span.
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liability. In the alternative, the dilapidated structures might be sold
to individuals who have meagre resources and therefore would not
be too worried about the risk of personal liability.
The point to be stressed here is that the proponents have omitted
to think through the impact of their proposal in terms of the basic
dichotomy in housing policy goals. Existing public policy is plagued
by the conflict between a desire to provide a given quantity of housing and a desire to provide a given quality. While the goals of providing an element of "retribution" and an element of self-help
among slum tenants may be served by tort penalties, furtherance of
these new ends could result in a reduction of housing quantity
without any improvement in the quality of the remaining buildings.
Just as it is said that large fines levied on the slum operator have the
effect of taking from the landlord the capital resources with which
housing quality could be improved, so it may be argued that large
tort judgments against the landlord have the same effect. A few
tenants who sue may end up with more money, but other tenants in
the same building will not be benefited as they would have been if
the landlord could have been induced to put the judgment money
(or the insurance premium) into upgrading the dilapidated housing.17 Only if the existence of the remedy, rather than its actual use,
so threatens owners that they are induced to improve the quality of
their buildings can it be concluded that the remedy will improve the
housing supply that remains on the market. We already have some
evidence that this cannot be expected. In New York, for example,
where physical injury resulting from a violation of the housing code
has produced an actionable tort for over fifty years, there is no indication that the landlords have been induced to improve housing
quality in order to remove the threat of this lawsuit.18
VII
In summation, we would strongly advise the judiciary not to
create a new tort of slumlordism. Such a tort would rest on weak
historical foundations; its rationale would spread far beyond the
problem with which the tort is intended to deal; it would call for
putting to the jury an almost unmanageable question; it would leave
us with numerous fringe problems and paradoxes; and, above all,
17. Note that the tort judgment, taking priority from day of judgment, would in
most cases be junior to any substantial real estate mortgage.
18. An early landmark case is Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E. 703 (1922).
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it is unlikely to move us very far, or in the right direction, in improving housing conditions in urban slums.
We submit that wider use of receiverships for slum properties
offers promise of accomplishing much more than resort to tort law.
Sax and Hiestand recognize that the receivership route has the distinct advantage of taking the crucial decision of whether to repair
away from the landlord and giving it to a fiduciary, the receiver,
who has the single objective of abating the nuisance of substandard
housing. Their proposed tort action, in contrast, would operate to
improve quality only indirectly and would leave the repair decision
where it was before-in the landlord or, in the case of an execution
sale to satisfy the judgment, in the hands of the purchaser at that
sale, whether he be the mortgagee, a judgment creditor (including
a tenant), or a third person unassociated with the particular controversy. The worry, expressed by the authors, that the receivership
remedy involves the financial community in a hostile relation to
housing reform is quite clearly not justified in th!:! light of extensive
experience with receiverships. Making the repair costs a lien superior
to an earlier real estate mortgage, as a receiver's action accomplishes
even at common law, involves the lending community as a participant in slum housing to no greater extent than does the existing
law in subjecting mortgage lenders to subordination for the real
property tax lien.19 Moreover, by giving a purchaser of a receiver's
certificate priority over an earlier real estate mortgage, the receivership route might create a healthy competition for investment in
slum housing. That part of the financial community now investing
in short or intermediate term investments would be confronted by
a new source of demand for funds. Comparing those lending institutions relying on mechanics liens and title retention security on
fixtures under the Uniform Commercial Code, both of which interests are prior to the real estate mortgage, with those institutions
financing real estate mortgages, indicates that the financial community is not monolithic. 20 Detriment to a particular mortgage
lender or type of lender may be offset by the gain to other types of
lenders.
19. It is argued by the authors that if the mortgagee's claim is subordinated to the
claim of the receiver arising out of repair and operation of the building, the result will
be to make ''the financial community the involuntary ally of the slum landlord." 65 MICH.
L. REv. 869, 919 (1967). This has not been the experience in Chicago. In many receiverships, the mortgagee has supplied the receiver with the additional funds.
20. For an early description of the types of credit suppliers operating in the intermediate tenµ credit market, see CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT, FEDERAL REsERVE RE·
PORT TO THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS 22·43 (1957).
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It is worth noting that the weaknesses which Sax and Hiestand
see in receivership proceedings are not a necessary product of the
remedy, but turn on the particular receivership statute examined by
them. There is no necessity that the receiver be a public official from
the building or other executive department of the city; the court,
unless a misguided statute limits its power, has inherent power to
appoint as receivers qualified "experts," including management
agents or not-for-profit housing groups. 21 There is no necessity that
the source of the funds for repair be a "kitty" maintained by the
city treasurer out of scarce tax revenues; the receiver can sell receiver's certificates in the commercial investment market so that
public funds are not involved at all. Further, there is no necessity
that the initiator of the receivership proceeding be an administrative
official in city government. A slight development of judge-made law
to permit the tenants of a building to initiate a receivership suit on
some theory, such as that of private nuisance, would give tenants
the same advantages of self-help as that seen by the proponents in
their new tort, and it would have the additional advantage of securing repair of the premises on the basis of a decision made by a courtappointed person. Finally, in order to enlist the aid of lawyers in
21. Recent statistics for receiverships handled, after court appointment, by one notfor-profit organization-The Chicago Dwelling Authority-are interesting in this connection:
SCOPE OF CHICAGO DWELLING AUTHORITY
RECEIVERSHIP PROGRAM AS OF JUNE 30, 1967
No. of
.Buildings

No. of
Dwelling Units

374
286
88

4112

PROGRAM STATUS

Receiverships Appointed
Less Discharges
Current Workload

3353
759

'\VORK SUMMARY

1. Rehabilitation

a. By Chicago Dwelling .Authority
.Buildings Completed
In Progress
Pending

63

11
4

22

70

1010

105

1239

31

323

53

498
197

b. By Owner with Chicago Dwelling

Authority Supervision
Brought into Compliance
In Progress
2. Demolitions
Completed
Pending

30

464
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the receivership remedy, the court must be able to pay the fees of
the plaintiff's attorney out of the proceeds which come into the hands
of the receiver.
Whether statutory authority is required for tenant commenced
proceedings and for court awarded attorney's fees is admittedly in
doubt. But for courts to institute those innovations would entail a
far less radical change than that called for in fashioning a tort of
indignity to cover slumlordism.

